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Harvard University Press, 2006) 415 pages; bibliography; index. Paperback $18.95, hardcover $35.00.
In 2000 Martha Nussbaum published Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach
(WHD), in which she applied the theory of capabilities developed by her and Amartya Sen to questions
of justice for women in developing countries, devoting considerable space to religion and the family. In
the preface to that book she promised a more comprehensive treatment of the approach and its relevance
for other questions of justice in a subsequent book. She compared the relationship between the two books
to the relationship between a 10K race and a marathon: the promised book was to be the marathon. The
present book, Frontiers of Justice (FJ), is at least a partial fulfillment of that promise. It undertakes to
show that the capabilities approach offers a better way to deal with disabilities, underdeveloped nations,
and animal rights than other approaches.1 In what follows I will be treating the book as a theoretical
work, but it is much more than that. It is a passionate and detailed discussion of the ways in which the
world can be made better for the poor and the disabled, and much of what it has to offer lies in the
passion and in the details, none of which can be conveyed in this review.
In WHD Nussbaum set out to distinguish the capabilities approach from utilitarianism, and to show
its superiority. In FJ her target is Rawls and contractarianism generally. The theoretical conclusions
of the book can be summed up in three propositions:
1. The traditional social contract approach to political theory, based upon the idea of
mutual advantage among roughly equal contractors, does not adequately deal with the
problem of securing justice for the disabled, for underdeveloped nations, or for animals.
The three categories all pose challenges to the contract tradition, since the disabled and animals are
not equal in power or resources to fully capable and competent human beings, and the nations of
the world are not even roughly equal.
2. The addition of Kantian restraints upon the contractors, as in Rawls’ Veil of
Ignorance, is not enough to mitigate the harshness of the outcome of the contracting
situation for these problem areas.
Among other things, the Kantian conception of the person requires that the contractors be fully
rational, a requirement that excluded the mentally disabled and animals from participation.
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3. The capabilities approach can do better, at least with respect to these three problems,
but only if a certain list of capabilities is privileged over others.
The capabilities approach starts from two premises: (1) that all should be brought to a position of
rough equality (rather than that all are roughly equal); and (2) that equality is to be measured not in
subjective states or in material goods, but rather in the capability to be and to do various things.
Jones and Smith might both own bicycles of similar value, but if Jones’s legs are paralyzed this
equality of ownership does not translate into equality of capability (even if, for some reason, Jones
is just as happy as Smith to own a bicycle). Smith can use his bicycle to get around, but Jones
cannot. People differ in their ability to convert goods into the ability to act, and in the end it is the
ability to participate, the ability to be and to do, that matters. Any theory, whether a maximizing
theory like utilitarianism or a maximin theory like Rawls’ theory or an egalitarian theory, which
measures social progress in terms of material goods or subjective satisfaction therefore falls short of
an adequate theory.
But not every capability is equally valuable. It might be helpful for us to start by distinguishing
Nussbaum’s approach from that of Amartya Sen, who pioneered work with capabilities.
I. The Capabilities Approach.
Consequentialist approaches to distributive justice are distinguished according to what it is that they
seek to maximize, or to maximin, or to equalize. The utilitarian wants to maximize utility, which
may mean any number of things, including happiness, a subjective state, or satisfaction of desires--
which may be either objective or subjective, or may involve both subjective and objective
considerations. (In at least one way of understanding the satisfaction of desires, Jones’ desire for a
Mercedes Benz is satisfied only if (a) Jones desires a Mercedes Benz; and (b) Jones has a Mercedes
Benz. It is not necessary, for his desire to be satisfied, for him to be aware that he has the car; it is
enough that he has the car. Suppose, for example, that unknown to him Jones was left a Mercedes
Benz in the will of a recently deceased relative. His desire is satisfied though he is not yet aware of
it. In that understanding, satisfaction is purely objective. On the other hand, “satisfaction” may also
refer to a purely subjective state; in one such sense his desire may be satisfied if he mistakenly
believes that he has the car.)
In Rawls’ work, once the demands of liberty and fair opportunity are satisfied it is resources,
including income and wealth, that are to be distributed so as to maximize the holdings of the least
advantaged. An purely egalitarian theory may promote equality of utility, or of resources, or of
something else entirely. The quantities to be maximized or equalized in a given account of justice
may be called the “currency” of that account. See Robert Hockett and Matthias Risse, “Primary
Good s Revisited: the ‘Political Problem’ and Its Rawlsian Solution,” Cornell Law School Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 55 (2006), p. 1.
There are standard objections to each form of currency. To take just two examples, a utilitarianism
that would maximize subjective utility must deal with the fact that resources are more efficiently
steered toward those who can most easily derive happiness or satisfaction from them and away from
those who have most the most difficulty--for example, the disabled. On the other hand, an
egalitarianism that would equalize subjective utility must give more resources to the one with more
expensive tastes (for example, the lover of fine and expensive wines), and fewer to the one with
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cheaper tastes (in Sen’s example, the “tamed” housewife, with lowered expectations for herself). It
takes more resources to bring the one with expensive tastes up to the level of happiness that is
achieved more cheaply for the one with less expensive tastes.
For reasons of this sort, Sen has argued for a currency of capabilities, defined as ways of being and
doing. An egalitarianism of this sort would not aim at promoting an equality of some subjective
state, or an equality of goods, but rather an equality of capability: equality of mobility, equality of
ability and opportunity to communicate with others, equality of ability and opportunity to engage in
leisure activities, equality of ability and opportunity to participate in political activity, and so on.
Concern with capability thus has to be distinguished from opportunity: a young woman might have
the opportunity to get an advanced degree without having the financial means. But it must also be
distinguished from “functioning:” everyone need not be making use of each of their capabilities. It
is conceivable that someone may have the capability to participate in elections without actually
doing so.
It is easier for some people to convert resources into capabilities than it is for others. Someone who
is physically disabled may require more resources to reach the same level of mobility as others. A
theory of justice that depends on equalizing capabilities, or some minimum level of capabilities,
would direct resources to those who require more to reach certain levels of capability. What the
“tamed” housewife would get in the way of resources would depend not on what it would take to
make her happy, but on what it would take to make her as capable as others in dealing with the
world (whether she chose, in the end, to deal with the world or not). And since it is focused on
what people can be and do rather than on their subjective states, it should not be subject to the
objection from expensive tastes.
In general, though, Sen has refused to privilege some capabilities over others--that is, he has refused
to say that some capabilities are better than others, or that some capabilities are undesirable--and
this creates a problem for a theory of justice based upon capabilities. There is a similar problem in
hedonistic utilitarianism: If happiness is the good, then all happiness should count in the grand total
or the grand average, even happiness caused by the suffering of others, for example. But it is not
right, our intuitions say, to encourage the pleasure that comes from suffering, and we should
distinguish good happiness from bad happiness. The problem is that it is not easy for the utilitarian
to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable satisfactions without taking a non-utilitarian
stand on good and bad states of affairs.
In the same way, as Nussbaum notes, Sen’s reluctance to distinguish good and bad capabilities is an
obstacle for a theory of justice.
Sen . . . uses language, again and again, suggesting that freedom is a general all-purpose
good, and that capabilities are to be seen as instances of the more general good of human
freedom. . . . [But] if capabilities are to be used in advancing a conception of social
justice, they will obviously have to be specified . . . . Either a society has a conception
of basic justice or it does not. If it has one, we have to know what its content is, and
what opportunities and liberties it takes to be fundamental entitlements of all citizens.
One cannot have a conception of social justice that says, simply, ‘All citizens are entitled
to freedom understood as capability.’ Besides being wrong and misleading in the ways I
have already argued, such a blanket endorsement of freedom/capability as goal would be
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hopelessly vague. It would be impossible to say whether the society in question was just
or unjust. (Nussbaum, “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice,
“ Feminist Economics, volume 9 (2003), pp. 46-47.)
Nussbaum does not share Sen’s reluctance, and gives us a list of ten central capabilities. The
capabilities on the list, in my words and in much abbreviated form, are these:
1. Being able to live a life that is worth living for a normal period.
2. Being able to have good health.
3. Being secure against assault, and being free to move from place to place.
4. Being able to use the senses to think, imagine, and reason.
5. Being able to develop emotional attachments to persons and things.
6. Being able to form a conception of the good life.
7. Being able to associate with others, and having the basis of self respect.
8. Being able to live with animals, plants, and the world of nature.
9. Being able to enjoy recreational activities.
10. Being able to participate in politics; being able to hold property.
(FJ 76 - 78. The same list appears in WHD 78 - 80, and in various articles) The better known
rights, such as freedom of religion, are intended to be instances of these ten capabilities. Indeed, the
list reads very much like a list of human rights, both negative (freedom of movement, freedom of
affiliation) and positive (good health, adequate nourishment, shelter), and Nussbaum is very much
aware of that. She compares the list to the rights provisions of newer constitutions, and promotes
the list as a model of rights. (FJ 154) The question of capabilities as rights, of course, is entirely
separate from the question of capabilities as a measure of social progress, and capabilities as rights
will require its own separate justification.
II. The Critique of Rawls: The Social Contract Tradition and the Kantian Conception of the
Person.
Just as utilitarianism was her target in WHD, Nussbaum’s target in this book is the Rawlsian theory
of justice--a theory she concedes is the best political theory we have so far. She finds four problems
with his theory, two arising directly from the social contract tradition in which Rawls writes, one
from Rawls’ Kantian conception of the person as fully rational, and one from the combination of the
two in the theory of primary goods. It is these four problems that cause Rawls to slight the problem
of disabilities at the contractual stage, and to defer it to the legislative stage of political
development. The same problems afflict his treatment of nations and of animals.
A. The use of income and wealth to index social position. Rawls lists five sorts of primary goods
that are used by the contractors in the original position to evaluate the various possible political
institutions. Two of these only come into play only after equal liberty and opportunity have been
established and we have arrived at the Difference Principle: namely, income and wealth and the
bases of self-respect. These are to be distributed in such a way that the least well off will be as well
off as possible.
Why does Rawls use income and wealth instead of, for example, capabilities? Because they are
measurable, for one thing. If we are concerned not simply to bring the members of society up to a
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certain level, but to make sure everyone is as well off as possible, given the accompanying
requirement of elevating the least well off, there must be some basis for comparing the holdings of
one person with the holdings of another. There is simply no way of comparing different capabilities
so that we might conclude, for example, that although in a certain social setting Jones has less of
capability C1, he has enough of capability C2 to offset that loss.
For another thing, the differences in capabilities will not be an issue for Rawls; as Nussbaum
repeatedly points out, those in the Original Position are of roughly equal abilities, mental and
physical. Thus differences in income and wealth or similar fungible goods are as good a measure as
any of the relative social benefits enjoyed by members of society--at least those who must be taken
into account in the original position. But what about those who are not able to process income and
wealth as efficiently as others? What about those who are physically or mentally disabled? That
problem will be dealt with later, at the legislative stage. It is not a question of justice for Rawls, as
we will see, but a question of charity or benevolence. Much the same is true of animals.
But this deferral to the legislative stage is not innocent, according to Nussbaum.
It skews the choice of primary goods, concealing the fact that health care and other forms
of care are, for real people, central goods making well-being possible. . . . Any theory of
justice needs to think about the problem from the beginning, in the design of the basic
institutional structure, particularly in its theory of the primary goods. (FJ 127)
Is the solution then simply to substitute capabilities for income and wealth as primary goods? That
might take us some distance toward justice for all, if it were possible; but given the makeup of the
persons in the Original Position it is not possible, according to Nussbaum. And even if it were
possible, we would still fall short of complete justice, because of the essential nature of the contract
in the social contract tradition.
Nussbaum is not after a social contract solution. Still, any version of the capabilities approach must
answer the question of comparability: how do we determine the optimal basket of capabilities when
there is no common metric by which to compare losses in one capability with gains in another?
Nussbaum’s answer is that the theory she is looking for is at most a partial theory. What she would
require is that the constitutional structure lift all members of society to a certain minimal level of
capability: for each capability, everyone is to have the same minimum of that capability. No trade-
offs are allowed; the question of comparability (among different capabilities) does not arise.
B. The requirement of mutual advantage needed to motivate the original contractors. The
motivation behind the social contract is (at least for many in the tradition) to escape a harrowing
state of nature and achieve mutual advantage through cooperation. The constitutional aim, therefore,
is rooted in self interest. This motivation is not, according to Nussbaum, an essential feature of the
social contract. The aim could be, for example, to create a context in which everyone could flourish
to the extent possible. Generally, however, the tradition has rejected the idea that benevolence
might motivate the contractors. Rawls accepts advantage as motivation out of a desire for
theoretical parsimony, constraining it with the veil of ignorance: No one in the Original Position is
interested in the interests of others, except insofar as they are part of his own interests. Because of
this restriction, the parties to the contract will not be concerned with those who cannot contribute to
the advantage of all, and especially those whose consideration would require investment that would
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not pay off. They will not be concerned about the “unproductive” members of society--at least not
at the contracting stage.
Why not, then, simply add benevolence, if it will take the contract closer to one that is truly just for
the disadvantaged? Because to do so would require “a willingness to sacrifice not only one’s own
advantage, but also the advantage of the group” (FJ 122) and that would undermine the project
itself:
[Adding benevolence as a motivating factor], Rawls objects, would greatly complicate
and perhaps render indeterminate the whole question of what principles would be chosen.
But if the benevolence added were sufficiently deep and inclusive, the change would also
require the approach to depart so far from the idea of a contract for mutual advantage
that there would be no point to using the metaphor of social contract at all. (FJ 123)
Nussbaum does not rule out the possibility that some form of contract theory, without the restricting
motivation, might do the job. But it is not her intention to provide such a theory. Her aim, instead,
is to show that her list of central capabilities, together with the rule that each person is to have at
least the minimum level of each, will guarantee justice in each of the three cases she is dealing
with.
She must deal, however, with the charge of intuitionism, in two forms. The first form of the charge
is that her choice of capabilities--her particular list of ten--is based on intuition only. Her answer to
that charge is that every theory at some point must be intuitionistic. Rawls’ own theory rests on
considered judgments, a form of intuition; they simply come in at a different point, in reflexive
equilibrium in setting up the Original Position. The second form of the objection is that with a list
such as she provides, and no method for ordering the list, any balancing of intuitions against one
another will have to be based on intuition merely. Her answer to that form of the charge (which she
takes to be the more serious) is, as we have seen, that the capabilities are not to be balanced, at least
not until the minimal level has been reached. Each person is to be provided with the means for
reaching the same level of capability.
It seems to me that the first version of the charge is really the more serious, and I am not satisfied
that Nussbaum has answered it. It is one thing to test a theory’s predictions against our intuitions,
when the predictions involve concrete cases. We may be inclined to reject utilitarianism, or at least
to modify it, because of the implication that in certain concrete circumstances we should punish the
innocent. It is another to accept the theory itself on the basis of a direct intuition: to argue, for
example, that utilitarianism is self-evidently true, so that its predictions should direct our feelings
about cases rather than the other way around. Nussbaum has presented a list of central capabilities
without any method for testing any one of them, or any method for testing the claim that justice
requires that minimal levels of each be attained by every human member of society. What intuitions
support the claim that expending endless resources to bring the severely disabled up to some
minimum level is better than expending those same resources to raise many people much farther
along the scale of capability, for example? We need not accept the faulty reasoning of The Bell
Curve to realize that trade-offs sometimes make sense, even in connection with the most basic level
of the most basic capabilities.
C. The circumstances of justice that (partly) define parties in the original position. The nature of
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the primary goods to be distributed under the Difference Principle is determined in part by the
nature of the contracting parties: They are free, equal, and independent. They are not only equal in
some moral sense; they must be “roughly equal” in physical capacity and power--a constraint that
Rawls takes from the tradition. Thus it is not just an assumption that will set the Rawlsian stage for
a more or less egalitarian outcome. According to Nussbaum:
[I]t also does crucial work inside each social contract theory, explaining how political
principles come out the way they do. The rough equality among the parties is crucial to
understanding how they contract with one another, why they would make a contract in
the first place, and what they hope to gain from the social contract. (FJ 31)
[T]he idea is that people will get together with others and contract for basic political
principles only in . . . circumstances in which they can expect mutual benefit and in
which all stand to gain from the cooperation. To include in the initial situation people
who are unusually expensive or who can be expected to contribute far less than most to
the well-being of the group . . . would run contrary to the logic of the whole exercise.
(FJ 104)
Rough equality thus goes hand in hand with mutual advantage.
Nussbaum, of course, wants to include the weak and the disabled in any deliberation about the basic
institutions of society. To let them into the Original Position works against mutual advantage, and
another motivation would have to be found to salvage a contract theory that included these folks.
But Nussbaum’s is not a contract theory, and does not suffer from these constraints.
D. The Kantian conception of the person. In addition to the basic difficulties of the traditional social
contract, with roughly equal individuals working for mutual advantage, the Rawlsian contractors
have another constraint: they must be fully rational, and possessing both a sense of justice and the
capacity for a conception of the good. Were they not rational, original deliberation would be
impossible. Furthermore, the contractors are contracting for persons very much like themselves in
this respect. As Nussbaum puts it, those by whom the contract is made are also those for whom it is
made. The society that is being set up is therefore a society of rational beings. Just as there is no
consideration of those who are not roughly equal in capacity and power at the state of choosing
basic institutions, so there is no consideration of those who are less than fully rational, whether
human beings who are mentally disabled, or nonhuman animals.
Not that the weak and mentally or physically disabled or animals will not eventually be the object
of consideration in Rawls’ theory. Such consideration simply comes at a later stage, as we have
seen. Great disparities in ability, either mental or physical, will be taken into account at the
legislative stage. But why? Why not include them at the bargaining stage?
The real issue for the contractarian . . . is the relative rarity of the non-‘normal’
impairment (defined as not normal just by reference to their relative rarity); this rarity
entails that expensive and difficult arrangements will have to be made to make work and
public space fully accessible to people who have them, enabling them to be ‘normally’
productive. Such expenditures, in general, greatly outweigh the return in economic
productivity made possible by the full inclusion of people with ‘abnormal’ impairments.
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(FJ 117)
We must set up our society to accommodate normal people, without the less common handicaps,
people who will be productive; and from the surplus they create we can fund, legislatively,
programs for the disabled. To put it that way, though, makes clear the role the disabled will play in
our society: they will be dealt with from the surplus, if any. They will be the objects of charity.
Certainly if any alternative approach is available, we ought to consider it; if any way to treat the
disabled as partners in a common enterprise exists, we should give it a hearing. The question, then,
is to what extent Nussbaum has given us such an alternative.
III. Capabilities and Disabilities.
The concern with disability is with both physical and mental disability, but Nussbaum concedes
that here, for the purposes of this discussion, she is more interested in mental disabilities. Her
substantive approach to disability begins by making two assumptions that distinguish it from the
social contract tradition: She takes benevolence as one of the motivations for cooperation, and she
bases human dignity not on the rationality of persons alone, but also on their animal nature,
involving as it does vulnerability and need.
We can now connect the two fundamental departures from contractarianism, by saying
that this new conception of what is dignified and worthy in the human being supports the
departure from [mutual advantage as motivation].We do not have to win the respect of
others by being productive. We have a claim to support in the dignity of our human need
itself. . . . Productivity is necessary and even good; but it is not the main end of social
life. (FJ 160)
What is the main end? It is “[l]iving with and toward others, with both benevolence and justice.”
And a life of that sort is marked by special regard for the ten capabilities.
How can this particular list of capabilities be defended? The list of capabilities can be attached to
different conceptions of the good life, and they will prove to be acceptable, Nussbaum insists, to
many across a wide (but perhaps not universal) range of cultures--“internationally, across lines of
tradition and religion.” (FJ 163)
The claim that is made by the use of this single list, then, is not that there is a single
type of flourishing for the human being, but rather, that these capabilities can be agreed
by reasonable citizens to be important prerequisites of reasonable conceptions of the
person as a political animal, both needy and dignified; and thus these are good bases for
an idea of basic political entitlements in a just society. (FJ 182)
But what about those who do not value--indeed, who disvalue--the central capabilities? One of her
examples is the Amish, who do not participate in elections and who do not value the ability to vote.
Let me try to reply as follows: These people have chosen to live in a pluralistic
democracy and to show respect for its values. . . . To that extent, they are different from
other members of their religious group whom we could imagine. These others may of
course exist inside a pluralistic democratic society, and their choices will be protected;
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but their view will not count as one of the reasonable comprehensive views, since it does
not express respect for the different views of their fellow citizens. (FJ 184 and footnote
21)
What the capabilities have in common, then, is that they will be affirmed by everyone who is
tolerant, who respects the different views of his fellow citizens. There may be others who do not
respect different views about some things, and their views are protected, but they do not count in
determining which capabilities are fundamental. The fact, however, that the ones who count have
chosen to live in a pluralistic democracy cannot get us very far. Imagine a group, for example, that
considers homosexuality morally wrong, for themselves and for others. They may have chosen to
live in a pluralistic democracy at a time when that democracy did not respect the right of
homosexuals to their own sexual orientation; and they may not be able to leave when that society
recognizes the right to privacy of homosexuals. Are they then withdrawn from the list of those who
count?
But even assuming that we have settled the question of who is to count and which capabilities are
basic, we find ourselves running up against a question that is more central to the theory. It may be
that not everyone can be provided with all the central capabilities; and it may be that some who can
be provided with all of them would require an extraordinary amount of resources to bring them to
that point. It is no longer about mutual advantage, so the mere fact that providing someone with a
certain capability requires an expenditure that might not be returned is not a problem. The fact that
it might be impossible to provide that capability is a problem though, and so is the fact that in
some cases providing the capability might be so expensive that attempting to do it might reduce the
standard of living so far that considerations of justice would no longer be among the most important
considerations. How are we to treat these cases without abandoning the project? There are two
possibilities: We might treat those who cannot reach the minimal level of a given capability as
belonging to a different species, and thus not entitled to all the capabilities that go along with
human dignity; we might create a different list, or a different threshold. Or we might regard the list
as aspirational, something to be achieved when reasonably possible.
Nussbaum rejects the first, and the reason she gives is that it would be too easy to categorize many
cases of disability that way, too easy to let ourselves off the hook.
[U]sing a different list of capabilities or even a different threshold of capability as the
appropriate social goal for people with impairments is practically dangerous, because it
is an easy way of getting off the hook, by assuming from the start that we cannot or
should not meet a goal that would be difficult or expensive to meet. Strategically, the
right course seems to be to harp on the single list as a set of nonnegotiable social
entitlements and to work tirelessly to bring all children with disabilities up to the same
threshold of capability that we set for other citizens. (FJ 190)
But we all know that will sometimes be impossible, no matter how many resources we are willing
to use up. What then? Then, apparently, we must acknowledge failure and concede that the case is
“unfortunate.” (FJ 192) This move, it seems to me, marks the list as--at least in part--merely
hortatory or aspirational, just as a list of rights and entitlements might be aspirational when there is
no forum for enforcing them. The Italian Constitutional Court has distinguished between
programmatic rights and preceptive rights; the latter requiring enforcement, the former--largely
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entitlements--not requiring enforcement. But what, then, is the cash value of calling them rights? It
lies in the fact that they are meant to guide state action when possible. Is the list of capabilities no
more than that? Though I’m sure she would not like the way I have characterized it, Nussbaum
seems to favor that option:
The main role of the list in thinking about public policy toward [someone so severely
mentally disabled] will be to pose the question: Has the public political arrangement in
which she lives extended to her the social basis of all the capabilities on the list? (FJ
193)
But what is the “social basis” of a capability, and how is it distinguished from the capability itself?
This is a question that Nussbaum does not answer.
I will grant that the cases in which capability-achievement is impossible will be rare, but it is a
factual judgment that will have to be made. And why is it not as susceptible of abuse as the “other
list, other threshold” judgment?
IV. Capabilities in the World.
Chapters 4 and 5 extend the capabilities approach to the problem of global justice. The problem
here is not just international justice, which suggests questions of justice between nations. In fact in
Chapter 4, continuing her critique of Rawls, she objects to the Rawlsian approach to this matter
precisely because it tends to see it as a problem of relations between nations, and not as a problem
of justice for the citizens of foreign nations. Her own view is, with Grotius, that the problem of
world justice is a problem of justice to individuals, not justice to nations.
For Grotius, all entitlements in the international community, including national
sovereignty itself, derive ultimately from the dignity and the sociability of human beings.
. . . The social contract tradition, by contrast, understands the situation that exists
between states as a state of nature, and imagined principles of justice being contracted as
if between virtual persons. (FJ 230 - 231)
She criticizes both the “two contract” approach of Rawls (one contract between
individuals within the state, a second contract between states), and the “one
contract” approach of Pogge and Beitz. The two contract approach to international
justice is insensitive to inequalities of power between nations (or else must exclude
weaker nations from the contract), just as the basic contract between individuals
assumed equality of power; it ignores the global economic order and its
depredations; it prevents serious consideration of redistribution across borders; and
it is insufficiently respectful of disadvantaged groups within each nation. The one
contract approach, on the other hand, is simply too vague, and lacks a theory of
motivation, since it cannot seriously be argued that negotiating with the citizens of
the world, most of whom live in a state of deprivation, could be for mutual
advantage, as the contract tradition requires.
In the first section of Chapter 5 Nussbaum outlines the argument I thought she
would make:
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1. The capabilities on her list are required for a decent human life.
2. Human beings are entitled to a decent human life.
3. Therefore we are under a collective obligation to provide the
capabilities.
The second premise is very powerful, and the missing premise is also very
powerful. The missing premise, of course, is
--If everyone is entitled to X, then we are under a collective obligation
to provide X.
Given those two premises, I believe, the conclusion does follow. But those two
premises require argument to support them, and none appears to be forthcoming. I
accept them, and so I accept the conclusion; and it may be that the argument is
only aimed at those who do accept them. Still, it would have been helpful to have
seen some argument in that direction. There are those within the Western tradition
who question whether we are fundamentally entitled to anything but the right to be
left alone, and of course there is strand of the egalitarian tradition that argues that
we are not under any obligation to provide for those who are responsible for their
own undoing. Nussbaum does not seem to recognize any such limitation.
Given her theory of entitlements, it is not surprising to see a defense of rights that
go beyond negative rights, as most modern constitutions do. She argues that what
is required in any acceptable bill of rights is not only a list of social and economic
rights in addition to the purely negative freedoms, but also a list of ways in which
the state is required to make it possible to enjoy the negative freedoms: to provide
the resources to make it possible for citizens to enjoy freedom of religion and
freedom of association, and to block private action that will interfere with freedom
of thought and speech. The capabilities approach, she argues, provides for these
resources and safeguards.
But we confront now, for the first time, the question of the level of each capability
to be provided. We have learned so far that a certain minimum, the same for all,
must be guaranteed. But now the question arises, must the minimum be the
maximum as well? That is, is everyone to have precisely the same level of each
capability, or may there be variation beyond the minimum?
Nussbaum distinguishes the capabilities: For some capabilities, adequate provision
is equal provision. Voting rights and religious freedom, for example, must be
equally provided: “To give some groups of people unequal voting rights, or unequal
religious liberty, is to set them up in a position of subordination and indignity . . .
.” (FJ 293) On the other hand, there are capabilities, such as capabilities that
depend on the ownership of property, “when what seems appropriate is enough.”
Not everyone must have a house of the same value; but all must have shelter. Still,
not everything that can be purchased with property is in this category. Education
and health care are so fundamental that grossly unequal shares would undermine
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the dignity of the recipients. Given that the differences are not too great, just how
much inequality in education and health care will be allowed will be reserved for
future deliberation--much as Rawls reserved the question of disability for the
legislative stage. The overriding concern, in judging all these issues, is the concern
for equal human dignity.
To what nations should the capabilities approach extend? Nussbaum takes the
notion of overlapping consensus from Rawls; more precisely, she takes the idea of
a “hoped-for” overlapping consensus. It should certainly not apply only to Western
democracies, where there are common grounds for liberal thinking; it must also
include newer democracies like India, which have their own tradition of toleration.
Beyond constitutional democracies, it may be extended even to nations like China,
where “there are also long-standing seeds of such ideas, and the modern debate has
drawn on them, moving liberal ideas into the forefront of political thinking.” (FJ
304) In such nations we cannot assume that the various comprehensive notions of
the good will all have room for a common list of central capabilities; but there is
enough there that we may “hope for” eventual consensus, and that is enough,
Nussbaum believes, to allow us to assert that we are justified in applying the
capabilities test to those countries.
[I]t seems to me that in the modern world the ideas of human rights are
by now so deeply rooted and so widespread that it is not possible to say
of any nation that it cannot achieve such a consensus over time. . . . I
conclude that there is no barrier of principle or argument against
pursuing the central human capabilities as goals for every nations, and
also for international society. (FJ 305)
The partial theory of justice based upon capabilities then may govern not only our
domestic decisions, but also our decisions as citizens of the world. (To say that we
may judge such nations is not to say that aggression against them is justified on the
grounds of their noncompliance with the list, however.)
But how should it govern our decisions as citizens of the world? Are we required
to plan our individual lives in such a way as to further, as much as possible, the
goal of justice for all in the world? Clearly not; it would require too much of us,
and would not, as Nussbaum says, leave each of us with a life. Instead, this is a
role for institutions to play, both domestically and globally. It is through
institutions of various sorts that justice can be done, institutions which, after all, are
designed to solve collective action problems; institutions which can act fairly,
where relying on individuals might result in disproportionate shouldering of the
burden; institutions which have the capacity to understand and deal with problems
of such magnitude. The domestic institutions that serve this purpose start at the
most general level with the departments of government, structured according to
separation of powers and some form of decentralization like federalism, and limited
by judicial review, and work their way down through the various agencies of
government, down to the police and the educational system. Together with all this
there must be policies, enforceable in the courts and through the agencies, to
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prevent corruption and discrimination.
And on the international level? Nussbaum is not interested in the establishment of a
world-state, which would not be sufficiently accountable, whose crimes would not
be subject to review by other states, which would not allow sufficient diversity.
Instead she is in favor a thin and decentralized international structure, one not too
different except in motivation (or so it seems to me) from the structure in existence
now. It would depend on the internal domestic structures of the individual states,
motivated by a concern for redistribution of wealth among nations; multinational
corporations, motivated by a concern for promoting capabilities in the places where
they do business; global agencies like the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank; international bodies like the United Nations and the International
Criminal Court; and finally NGOs of various kinds concerned with problems of
human development in the world. But the international order is not coercive:
[T]he allocation [of responsibilities to these various entities] is an ethical
allocation, and political only in the sense that it is aspirational and we
should try to bring it about, since there is not coercive structure over the
whole that would enforce on any given part a definite set of tasks. (FJ
315)
Nussbaum ends her consideration of global justice with ten “Principles for the
Global Structure.” These are, I think, worth repeating here. We must first require of
each nation that it do what it can to maintain the capabilities of its citizens; we
recognize, though, that the poorer nations can do only so much and will require
help. Second we must respect the sovereignty of nations; though persuasion and
coercion through treaties and international law are permitted, forceful intervention
is permissible only in rare circumstances. Third, the richer nations must give a
substantial portion of their surplus to poorer nations. (She mentions 2% of GDP as
a desirable target; the U.S. currently spends .01% of its GDP on foreign aid.)
Fourth, multinational corporations must be required, by domestic legal systems but
also by the good consciences of their managers and shareholders, to attend to
questions of human development. Fifth, the international economic order must be
fair to poor and developing countries. Sixth, there must be a thin international
structure that is concerned with international criminal law and crimes against
humanity; with environmental and health issues; with trade and labor relations; and
with redistributive taxation. Seventh and eighth, the focus must be on the
disadvantaged and on care for the disabled, the ill, children and the elderly. Ninth,
questions of justice should extend to the family; there should be no distinction
between the private and public spheres such as exists now. And tenth, a special
responsibility for education:
All institutions and individuals have a responsibility to support
education, as key to the empowerment of currently disadvantaged
people. Education is a key to all the human capabilities. And, as we
have seen, it is among the resources most unequally distributed around
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the world. (FJ 322)
V. Conclusion.
It seems odd that Nussbaum does not mention the relationship of the capabilities
approach to traditional egalitarianism; it seems odd, for example, that she does not
mention Roemer. See, for example, John Roemer, Theories of Distributive Justice
(Harvard, 1996). The book takes Rawls as its foil, of course; but is Rawls
contractarianism and not his egalitarianism that is the focus of her critique. For all
her discussion of utilitarianism, the theory of capabilities is at base an egalitarian
theory. It seeks equality in the distribution of capabilities, at least to the level of
adequacy; it does not countenance trade-offs; and it is open to many of the
objections that egalitarianism is open to. For one thing, it does not have a place for
individual responsibility, and the capabilities approach may require society to
provide for the capabilities of those who refuse to provide for themselves.
Still, in the world we live in that last point is merely a theoretical quibble. A great
number of the world’s people are drowning in poverty. Great numbers of women
around the world are deprived of any sort of basic human freedom. Children die
early; men and women work in conditions of slavery. Women and men turn to
prostitution to support their families and themselves. Before we get to the point
where we are entitled to blame whole societies for their refusal to work, we
ourselves have a great deal of work to do.
The book has very little to do with what made the capability approach important,
i.e., its criticism of utility and resources as measures of social progress. It has, on
the other hand, a great deal in common with an approach based upon rights, and it
seems to me that the book would not be much different if it were predicated upon a
list of basic rights rather than central capabilities. It is, in fact, a theory of rights to
certain capabilities, and in an obvious sense it is much fuller than the theories of
rights we are accustomed to. It not only includes positive entitlements, which many
theories of rights and many constitutional lists of rights also include. It also gives a
meaning to the negative rights, to freedom to associate, freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, and to participatory rights like the right to vote, that makes
clear that the state has a role in enabling citizens to make use of those rights.
Frontiers of Justice has faults. It could have been organized better. It is repetitive.
(In some places the same sentences are inexplicably repeated several times within a
paragraph.) It takes a great deal for granted. But the problems it deals with are
pressing problems, and they cannot be ignored.
Michael Corrado
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Note
1. In this review I will concentrate mainly on the first two categories, people with
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disabilities and underdeveloped nations. The same defects that taint the contract
approach with respect to the mentally and physically disabled will taint its
approach to animals.
